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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

Case No 960236CA

:

Argument Priority 15

vs.
DAVID PARKER
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendant

appeals

from a judgment

dated March

15, 1996

awarding the Plaintiff the sum of $2,746.47, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum from the date of said
judgment until paid in full, entered in the Third Judicial Circuit
Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department by the Honorable
Michael L. Hutchings. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Question:

Can this Court review the Trial Judge's

findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence and not
objected to by the Defendant?
Standard of Review

Findings of Fact, whether based on

oral or documentary evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.

Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Farm

Bureau Mut. Ins v. Johnson 738 P2d 652, 654 (Utah App 1987)
1

2. Question: May the Trial Court allocate a portion of fault
to a person, who is neither named as a defendant in the action nor
a person immune from suit, who contributed to the alleged injury?
Standard of Review
correctness.

Questions of law are reviewed for

State v. Pena 869 P 2d 932 (1994)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Applicable provisions are reproduced in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff brought a subrogation action asserting the
insured's claim against Defendant for property damages to the
insured's vehicle. On the 8th day of February, 1996, the case was
tried to the Court, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, presiding.
After receiving testimony from witnesses for the Plaintiff and the
Defendant, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in
the amount of $2,746.47 plus interest.

The Defendant timely

appealed the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 19th of June, 1995, the Plaintiff's insured, John
Schirack was driving east in Big Cottonwood canyon, near Storm
Mountain.

(R-ll)

This area was posted as a slide area.

As the

insured came to a curve, he noticed a rock in the road.

The

insured turned to the right and hit one of the rocks coming down
the

hill.

The

insured

drove

further

along

approximately a hundred years, where he stopped.

the

highway,

He noticed a

large trail of fluid coming from his vehicle. (R.-21-22)
A short time thereafter, Officer Bench arrived at the scene.
2

(R-22)

Officer Bench testified that he arrived quickly at the

scene because he was told someone was pushing rocks onto the
highway. (R-6)

When Officer Bench arrived at the scene he saw

three individuals up on the slide area. They had gotten themselves
in a precarious position, and in so doing, had kicked several rocks
down onto the road, one of which had done damage to the insured's
vehicle. (R-6)
The Defendant came down to the road and told Officer Bench
that he was a guide. The Defendant stated that he was guiding the
other two and he was the one responsible for the accident (R-6,89,16,25) The Defendant admitted that he'd been in the area before
that time. (R-7) Officer Bench noticed there were several rocks on
the road. (R-8)
The Defendant specifically requested that Officer Bench not
charge the other two people he was guiding. (R-9)
The Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant for the sum of $2,746.47.

The Court found that by a

preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was the guide,
that he was responsible for the rock slide, he certainly was the
leader, the one that led out, began to move across the rock slide
area.
The Defendant had driven to this area many times, he knew that
it was a rock slide area, he referred to it as probably the worst
rock slide area in that particular canyon.

He was very familiar

with the road and very familiar with the fact that rocks could fall
from that particular mountain area on to the road.
3

The Court was persuaded by the fact that the Defendant talked
to the Officer, made a statement to the Officer that he was
responsible for what had taken place.

The word "guide" was used,

whether or not - I'm not exactly certain beyond a reasonable doubt
that he used the word "guide", but by a preponderance of the
evidence, I find the word "guide" was his word that was utilized or
stated at this particular time.
There were clearly a number of rocks on the road down in that
area, 15 or 2 0 rocks. The rocks didn't all fall at the same time,
and in the estimation of the Court, when the Defendant began to
lead this expedition, I mean, there are certain risks associated
with it, there are certain duties associated with it, the duty to
climb across the mountain without causing any rock slide, or
causing rocks to fall on to the mountain road.
about

the

fact

that

there

were

rock

Certainly, he knew

slides

in

the

area,

nevertheless, he undertook to pursue the matter.
At the specific request of Counsel for the Defendant, the
Trial Judge included a finding that there's no pecuniary interest
between Mr. Parker and the other people that were involved in the
climb itself.
The way I'm apportioning negligence is zero percent to the
driver of the vehicle, 100 percent to Mr. Parker in this particular
case.
Well, what I mean by this is, Mr. Parker did not bring anyone
else in on this case; I mean, he didn't file any third-party
complaints against anyone else. He basically stands here alone. (R
4

- Judges Ruling pg's 5-9)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

The findings of

fact and conclusions of law were supported by oral evidence
presented at trial and are not clearly erroneous. The Trial Judge
did not commit reversible error in refusing to allocate fault to
non defendants under Section 78-27-39 UCA.

Further, the Trial

Judge committed no error in holding the Defendant as the leader of
the group. Liability under Section 78-27-38 UCA does not depend on
whether there was a pecuniary interest between members of the
hiking party.
ARGUMENT
The point argued by the Defendant on appeal that there was no
pecuniary interest between the Defendant and the other hikers was
raised only in the closing argument by Counsel for the Defendant.
It was not raised either in the pleadings and was not presented to
the Trial Court. This Court in the case of US Xpress, Inc v. Utah
State Tax Commission 886 P 2d 1115 (Utah App 1994) held that absent
extraordinary circumstances or plain error, issues cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.

This Court should not consider

whether there was a pecuniary interest between the Defendant and
the other two hikers, because other than in closing argument, it
was not presented to the Trial Court for resolution.
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
5

"Finding of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of witnesses.,f
The Trial Court in announcing its decision stated that after
hearing the evidence in the case, I rule in favor of the Plaintiff
and against the Defendant for the sum of $2,746.47.
I'm convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant was,you might say the guide, that he was responsible for
the rock slide, he certainly was the leader, the one that led out,
began to move across the rock slide area. (R- Judges Ruling P.5)
Mr. Parker had driven in this area many times, he knew that it
was a - a rock slide area, he referred to it as probably the worst
rock slide area in that particular canyon.

He was very familiar

with the road and very familiar with the fact that rocks could fall
from the -- from that particular mountain area onto the road.
In face, you know, I'm persuaded by the fact that he talked to
the officer, made

a

statement

to

responsible for what had taken place.

the officer,

that

he was

The word "guide" was used,

whether or not -- I'm not exactly certain beyond a reasonable doubt
that he used the word "guide", but at least by a preponderance of
the evidence, I find that the word "guide" was his word that was
utilized or stated at this particular time." (R- Judges Ruling P. 6)
These findings were supported by the testimony of Officer
Bence, and John Schirack that the Defendant admitted he was the
guide, that he was guiding the other two and was responsible for
the accident. (R- 6,8-9,16,25)
6

Further, the Defendant specifically requested that Officer
Bench not charge the other two people he was guiding. (R - 9)
The Defendant, on appeal, argues that the Court committed
reversible error in not apportioning fault to non parties.

In so

arguing the Defendant quotes Section 78-27-38(4) UCA as follows:
"In determining the proportionate fault attributable to
each defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested
by a party shall, consider the conduct of any person who
contributed to the alleged injury regardless of whether
the person is a person immune from suit or a defendant in
the action and may allocate fault to each person seeking
recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune
from suit who contributed to the alleged injury."
The Defendant, in quoting the above section, ignores the
remaining portion of the paragraph, which limits allocation of
fault to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to
any person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
This interpretation of the applicable section was recognized
by the trial judge when he found:
"Well, what I mean by that is, Mr. Parker did not bring
anyone else in on this case; I mean, he didn't file any
third-party complaints against anyone else. He basically
stands alone." (R - Judges Ruling P. 8)
At the specific request of the Counsel for the Defendant the
trial court included a finding that there was no pecuniary interest
between Mr. Parker and the other people that were involved in the
climb itself. (R - Judges Ruling P. 8)
No where in the Utah Liability Reform Act is required a
finding of pecuniary interest as a prerequisite to finding fault.
Section 78-27-37(2) UCA defines fault as follows:
11

(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
7

injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach
of express or implied warranty of a product, products
liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a
product."
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v Johnson
738 P. 2d 652, 655 (Utah App 1987) the finding of a pecuniary
interest in a joint enterprise was necessary before holding the
owner of the vehicle liable for damages.

The case of Mukasey v.

Aaron 438 P. 2d 702 (Utah 1968) involved the application of the
former Utah Guest Statute - Section 41-9-1, UCA, which was declared
unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court in Malan v. Lewis 693 P.
2d 681 (Utah 1984) .

This former statute required a finding of

pecuniary interest before recovery for injury to a guest was
allowable.

There is no such requirement in the instant case.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.

These findings of fact and conclusions

of law were supported by credible evidence presented at the trial.
Under Section 78-27-38(4) UCA the trial judge may not allocate a
portion of the liability to non defendants, whom the Defendant
elected not to interplead as third party defendants.

There is no

requirement of Utah law that the trial judge must find a pecuniary
interest between the Defendant and the other two hikers before he
may assess liability to the Defendant.

Therefore, the Plaintiff

requests the Court of Appeals to affirm the decision of the trial
court.
8

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

W

day of September,

1996.
CHAD B. MCKAY
Attorney for Appelle
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing Brief to Rodney R. Parker, Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor, Post Office
Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, Attorney for Appellant,
postage prepaid this ID
day of September, 1996
^

ChacT B. McKay
Attorney for Appelle

9

STATUTES AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

instructions. Morgan v. Quailhrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).

P.2d 462 <1971>; Flynn v W.P. Harlin Constr.
Co.. 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P 2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974i; Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975»; Lamkin v. Lynch. 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter. 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991).

Written i n s t r u c t i o n s .
— F a i l u r e to t e n d e r .
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he couhft not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. (Toward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen. 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
•1964); Memrnott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
$ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §ss 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jurv thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jurv thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell propertv, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51. and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key N u m b e r s . — Trial ®=> 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
146
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Rule 52

considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t . Upon motion of a party made not later than 1.0 Jays after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(o W a i v e r of findings of fact am* c o n c l u s i o n s of law. Except in actions
f.ir di\urv<\ fimiin-- >>i '.i.-t MIKI r,.p.i Uisions of law may be waived by the
pjrt ie> f u an issue of tact:
• 1 i) v (1 efa1111 o r b y f. i... -.;.-, ' . p o e a r a t t h e I,ria 1;
> l' h \ rur.M-nl ii w i it mj.'., liieci m t h e c a u s e ;
• .'.) \>\ oi\il c u r i - c i . l n i o p e n (••".:'! •< n t e r c d w :!-.<• n - m u t c s .
i A m e n d . M ! r.f'tecu\< J a n . 1, lii.^7. 1
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. -— This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule o\'5.
NOTES T' " Ml " I' I
A NA LYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error
—Submission In pn-wuhn^ pails
Court's diMTefhin
—Water dispute.
Findings of Mil n in i

Time.

Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
— Preclusion of summary judgment.
-Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
--Standard of review.
- --Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
-•- -Criminal trials.

Amendment.
—Motion.

Conformance with original findings.

IS

Findings of tacts by jury.
intent..

Juvenile proceedings.

New trial.

Purpose of rule.

Notice of appeal.

Stipulations.
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78-27-33
TilSCilfeger Kill*

170

JUDICIAL CODE
M

"

•'

l"''<

.i)vi»\-,i- | n r

883 F. Supp iW)M it ("tab !•••*".

i h e . .;. i I ' t ' l . U K ' S i ' t "DI p . . ^f)7 i'" S i i p p

"-()•'

Utah 1994); Mori v Mon, MM; P::.; i.l-T.l
Ct. App. 1995).

cm

• i h l t A i , REFERENCES
A-L.R. - Execution, out.-ide -»i h*1 (;ji. of
guaranty of ohligal ions under contiart to bo
performed within forum state as conferiirm

7o-Ai-oii.

jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors under
"long-arm" statute or rule of forum, 28
A i, k r>th (JO *

MatemtwH ut • ivjurvd p e r s o n — ?T^len inadmissible as e\ ide

Except as otherwise pn-vidt1*, \rt this act. ;\i\y statemei it, either written c u:
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while
this person is enuiiiied in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries
sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person
whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except
a law enforcement officer, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil
proceeding brought by or against the injured person for damages sustained as
a result, of the occurrence, unless:
t l 1 a written verbatim copy of the statement has been h-:\ >\\\:\ ••:-•
ed party at the time the statement was taken; and
.-/ the statement has not been disavowed in writing within liiteen days
of the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the
injured person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitnr' 11 "- •'" " K : - ;the person has been confined, whichever date is later.
H i s t o r y L. 1973, vh. 208, $ 2; 1992. <-n. :>0t
§ 180,
A m e n d m e n t Nott\-:. - I <;•• 1992 amendnif nt. tMleciive Ann I 1.7 \U92, n'visod lb.- ^ub-

78-27-u ^.

.section designations by deleting ''• ' '" h<:m ':;<
beginning and substituting numln-r designtions for lower-case letters.

i^elease, s e t t l e m e n t or s t a t e m e n t by injured per
s o n — When r e s c i s s i o n or cl isavowal provisions
iiiappn.-.t*'?--.

This act shall not apply in the following circumstances:
If at least five days prior to signing the settlement agreement, liability
release, or statement, the injured person has signed a statement in
writing indicating his willingness that the settlement agreement, liability
release, or statement be given or signed.
I h s t o i y J,. I'iV.j. r h . 20S. ^ ;;; 1J)1*2, t h. .'JO,
§ 181.
Amorulm.'j't N,. • :-v:"
1

78-2'*

ment, cileclive A{>ni lf, > l\)\V2t h-leted %*.
former subsection (1) designatj"! .• ih" IHKTI
m i w o f t b e ^eition

. n i b i ^ ^ i. . . i v c u v e unii

As used in Section.37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant
.s a person, other than
as defined in Subsection »3;. who is claimed to
any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of
proximately causing or contributii lg to injury

a person immune ;rom suit
be liable because of fault to
legal duty a a , or omission.
or damages sustained by a

[71

MISCELI AM-'DI'S PirAdSIuNb

7H-27'll7

person seeking recovery, in*
4 ..uence in all JUS m.-giuus, tumiiuutory negligence, assumptio
Avici liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a pi^im :. j.i^.jiji-i ...I h \ . an-! misuse, modification
or abuse of a product.
{o} "Person immune from smf nit-ai
UU an emplover immune j:Mi:i -• •; ^ndor Title '35, Chapter ; :: .:;
and
L ' a goveramenial cntn\ (ir- g u vernmental employi i e niiiiniiii: i'roni
suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own bebai- • >•
\u iia',:" .(' . mt: . T :'br ubo!' :i is
TmMiorized fo xr{ as legal repressiial i..

D e f i n i t i o n s IKHVct^ t- J u l y j , ]»{)7J.
Aw ?/>-/'J m Sections 7 <J-'27-117 ihnjmji th „ t \:\:
\ ) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit
as defined in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to
any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification,
or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person i m m u n e it m i : M J I I m i ; < n j . - .
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 3;1A, Chapter 3,
W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t o r Act, <>r Charier 'a. L'tah < Voupa1. i-Mia! Disease Act; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental einployee immune from
suit pursuant to Title b3, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act,
1) "Person seeking recovery'1 means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized h- :<^ as leuml representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-.'*7, r i i a e k - d lis- C
1986, ch. 199, § 1; 1994, c:h. 21; I, § 2; 1990,
eli. 240, § 374.
A m e n d m e n t Not*-s.
T;-, 1991 .U,„-M}
ment, e!T- .•!•-.-• Ma\ 2 1991, added Suhseciio n

d) and made related and stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997,
substituted the code citation in Subsection
( ;j) {a ) for'Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2."
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('iu-i> i. .ill. nvfst Const:
P.:!d 9i: /.'Lib Ci. App 199 ! -

.. i-^iii.cr, 886

COEEATERAI, REFERENCES
I Jiali I ,aw Review.
A Step Backwards in
Products Liability Law: The Utah Supreme
Court and Comment K, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 101.
Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Nonparty Joint Tortfeasors, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 444.
Bfigliaiii Young L a w Review. — Survey of
11 tali Strict Products 1liability Law: From llabii

u it v. Prr-seni and Mewiinl, WVJ'l H Y.l\ L l'--v.
i!\:
A.L.R.
At-;• ii• d-iln\ -4 u>mp..! .ih-.e rnvh
gence doctrine to actions based on n<-;du-;-.-nt
misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R.5th 46 I.
Validity and effect of "Mary Carter" or siniilar agreement setting maximum liability of one
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r o d ft |c i -< t
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ifiici^ii-fin^ cotoi lleasui, 12 A.L.R.5th

Ki-:

t inruisiii > \r
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C o m p a r a f r . :• 'H^Iigeru *%

that person.
(2) A person si-eluiip nrtiviM; • -MV IT-C.IVI-I /• mi any UL :. :.-».:.
...,; ..
defendants who^e fault, c-imhined with (he fault of persons immune fn-m suit,
exceeds the fault of the person seeking HMMUPTV prior 1o anv n-'iiln< a: inn nf
fault made under Subsection 78-27-39C2).
(3) No defendant, is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in
excess of I lie pronortion of fault attributed in that defendant iinder Section
78-27-19.
Mi (a) in determining wie pmpnrn. . • ' i-;.t attributable to each defendant, the fact finder may, and wht-u >-. Muesied by a party shall, consider
the conduct of any person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless
of whether the person is a person immune from suit or a defendant in the
action and may allocate fault to each person seeking recovery, to each
defendant, and. to any person immi ine from si lit who eonf ribi ited to the
alleged injury.
ibi Any fault allocated to a person immune from <\u\ is u.-nsider^d only
to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a
defendant and may not subject the person inn mine from suit to any
; i a h i i i t v, b a s e

•I-.

a! ;• n oi l a i n

H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 7H-27-.J8. -Mi.n-t^d i • 1
1986. ch. 199, § 2; 1994, eh. 221, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. -- The 1994 am- '
ment, effective May 2, 1994, added the subsection designations and added Subsection (4);

••••WOte S t i b s i T ' . i d h

Mi v o i l i e r ;u*1'«.
( 2 ' . v-h-i :. L,\:_, . .-

%

"He

may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds his own"; added
the section citation in Subsection (3); and made
stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Apportion nioi
Breach of wai t *:-.•>.
Causation.
Contractual indemnity provision.
Im pleader.
Open and obvious dang«M
Proportion of fault.
Cited.
Apportionment.
The purpose and intent of this act require
t h a t a jury account for the relative proportion of
fault of a plaintiff's employer that may have
caused or contributed to an accident, even
though the employer is immune from suit.
Apportionment of fault does not of itself subject
the employer to civil liablity. Rather, the apportionment process merely ensures that no defendant is held liable to any claimant for an
amount of damages in excess of the percentage
of fault attributable to that defendant. Sullivan
v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993);
Dahl v. Kerbs Constr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah
1993); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858
P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).

B r e a c h of w a r r a n t y .
A court shall consider a plaintiff's comparative negligence and comparative assumption of
the risk in determining liability for a claim of
breach of warranty. Interwest Constr. v.
Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Plaintiff's knowing acceptance of a defective
product, and its subsequent modification and
negligent operation of that product, will prevent it from recovering damages for branch of
express or implied warranty. Interwest Constr.
v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Causation.
When a defendant is dismissed due to a
determination of lack of fault as a matter of law,'
the defendant is excluded from apportionment,
which does not subject the remaining defend
dants to liability for damages in excess of their
proportionate fault. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain
Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
Contractual indemnity provision.
The Liability Reform Act renders useleai
indemnification for any tort liability other than!
oiic's own; thus, a provision in an agreement

i.;i

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

'between a general contractor and yubcunh actor indemnifying the general contractor "from
and against any and all loss, damage, injury,
liability, and claims thereof... resulting from
Sub-contractor's performance" indemnified the
general contractor for liability arising from its
own negligence. Ilealey v. J.B. Sheet Metal,
Inc., 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Implead er.
Defendant was permitted to implead a t h u d
party defendant in order to determine apportionment of fault. Tietz v Blackner, 157 V U I)
510 ID. Utah 1994).
Open a n d o b v i o u s d a n g e r .
The presence of an "open and obvious" danger
is merely one factor for the trier of fact to
consider when assessing the liability of the
defendant in a strict liability case — it does not
operate as a complete bar to the injured party's
recovery. House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.^d
542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted, 899
I'2d li!;U (Utah MWS)

78-27-39

1'iopot Lion of fault.
Since, under this section, third party plaintiff
cannot be held liable for any amount in excess
of the proportion of fault attributable to it, the
fact finder must determine the proportion of
fault (if any) attributable to third party (bleu
dant. Brown v. Boyer-Washington
lllvd
Assocs., 856 F.2d 352 (Utah 1993).
If a plaintiff's proportion of fault is less than
I hat of a defendant, or group of defendants, the
factfinder is required to determine "the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to
each party seeking recovery and to each defendant" and reduce the award of damages accordingly, however, if a plaintiff's sfiare of fault
exceeds defendant's, plaintiff recovers nothing.
Interwest Constr. v. Palmei, 886 I'2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
C i t e d in WaJkei v Union Lac. 11.R., 844 R2d
335 (Utah Ct. App 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
B r i g h a m Young Law Review.
Suivey of
1 Ttah Strict Products Liability Law. From Hahn
to the Present and Beyond, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
J I 73.
Note, Sullivan v. Seoul a r Cram Co.. Appojtioning the Fault of Immune Employers, 1994
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 187.
A.L.K. — Modern status of rule imputing
motor vehicle driver's negligence to passenger
on joint venture theory, 3 A.L.R.5th 1.
Comparative negligence: judgment allocating
fault in action against less than all potential
defendants as precluding subsequent action
against parties not sued in original action, 1
A.L.R.5th 753.

VH-U'rf III).

Pioducts liability application of stncl liability doctrine to sellei of used produil, 9
A.L.R.5th 1.
Sufficiency of evidence to raise last clear
chance doctrine in cases of automobile collision
with pedestrian or bicyclist — modern cases, 9
A.L.R.5th826.
Legal malpractice: negligence or fa nil of < h
ent as defense, 10 A.L.R.5th 828.
Intentional provocation, contributoiy or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as
defense to action foi injury by dog, 11 A.L.K 5th
127.
Applicability of comparative negligence principles to intentional torts, 18 A.L.K.5«h 525.

S e p a r a t e s p e c i a l vercImi Is.

iiiii I (.ill il.im.in.r'i aiiiMil

proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, diuict the
jury, if* any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune
from suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
{2} (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all
persons immune from suit is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce
that percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to the
percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to each party by Hie
fact finder. After this reallocation, cumulative fault shall equal 100% v, il h
the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault.
lb) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all
persona immune from suit is 40% or more, that percentage or proportion

78-27-40

J l JDK JIM . C O D E

of r n u u < u t n » • <f < "! •• ;
-;.-. • J
..*
-:--; be reduce'' ;j)d*
f
Subsection ' J t
fc) M) The jury may not n an - •;
::.< » tv< t wj any real!
under Subsection (2).
•II1 The jiirv may be advised that fault attributed U: person;
immune !Vn:n . ,-• -:."•• --•l-.rv *1^
*•'' r iU-- ;•-. • . - -eekinrecovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not b> JH-M IIJII-IC, .;-* *v. •. • n.
allocation, of fault, i n this or any other action.
Uis-i»r\ * 1^">.J "* ..
- '
'
i9Hi>. r}\, 199. $ •); . = '.- *T ... . . .
A m e n d n i c n t Notos. — The 1994 amendrient, olTprm" Mav 2. 1994, added the Subsect.nT-, , 1 i .if»«'^n,ip'*n. ,JIU1P<1 ''.ind to :mv p e r s o n

lmmuiio ftom suit who contributed to the allognd injury" and made a related change in
Subset-fun- 11), and added Subsections (2) and
i'3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
<'itpfl m Jnt» j rwest I ' o n s i r

i

- t'jih'ior. ^ 8 0

7S-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of
'*;uih
No contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages euuivali-nt Ju ?he percentage or pr:>pi?rt ion of fault. :Uirii--;t.-i5 to
t h a t defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entuled i,- v-onlribulion iroin any other perso...
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action
against any person immune from suit to recover damages resultlug from the
allocation of fault under Section 78-27-38.
H i s t o r y : C, 1953, 78-27-40, cnactecl by I ,.
1986, c h . 199, § 4; 1994, ch. 221, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1994 amend-

inent, effective May 2, 1994, added the subsection designations, added Subsection (3), and
made a stylistic change.

Apportionment.
The intent of the Liability Reform-Vi, ^$ , >i
27-37 to 78-27-43, was to require that a jury
account for the relative proportion of fault of a
plaintiff's employer in causing an accident.
Apportionment of an employer's fault does not

subject the employer to civil liability, but ensures that no defendant is held liable to any
claimant for an amount of damages in excess of
the percentage of fault attributable t* that
defendant. Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).

78-27-41

J oinder of defendants.

(1) A person seeking recovery, or anv < i1>i< i,•:• u . ^ 11w i^ < i JMS U to the
litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordant- with the Utah Utiles of Civil
Procedure, any person other than a person h u n - m e from suit who may have
caused or contributed to the injury or damage lor which recovery is sought, for
the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, >
may be allocated to a person immune from suit solely for the pu
accurately determining the fault of the person seeking recover) and a defen-

RECORD

DIRECT EXAMINATION
:-.Y MR. McKA'Y :

.

' •

Q!

On or about June 19th of 1:994, were you called to

A

Yes

Q

Do you remember who made that phone call?

A

I don't remember who made the phone call.

I was.

It had

something to do with rocks being pushed down onto the road.
"

i i i i I • ::! i • :l \ • : i i r e s p o n d t: : til ie s:i te?

A

Y e s . I did.

Q

A i i d :: a i i } D i i t: e J ] i i s A 1 i a t: i i a p p e n e d

A

W h e i I I arrived at the scene, there was, I believe,

three individuals up on the slide area.

:i f: a i i \; t: 1 :i :i r i g ?

They had got

themselves in a precarious position and in doing so, had
kicked several rocks down onto the road, and one of those
)ck:s ha :i :Ic ne d a m a g e t:<

I be] :i e v e :i t: • as a

1;

an, i t: had

done damage to the transmission, I believe :i t was.
i \ i id a t

tl: lat: t i i i: ie

:i i I t a 1 k::i i: lg wi t l i : i ie

: f tl: ie

i nd i v I dua 1 s , I don ' t remember t he name,, he s a i d t hat he wa s a
, -i i d e a n d 11 I a t 1: i • a w a s g i l :i d i i i g 11 I e < ::»11 i e :i : t: , • :> a i i d I: :i E

" a s t: 1

responsible for the accident.
Q

Okay

Did you prepare a report about the ii icIdents

oi that day?
A

Yes,

Q

Okay

I did.
A n d d :i • :1 ;; : •} i 1 la ,; ' e a i l iuppoi: t:n in :i t \

!:: : • t a ] 1 : ; - i tl: I

the individual?

3 |

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I talked with both individuals.
You don't remember--what did you--you talked

4 | to both individuals, meaning the driver of the car and the
5 I person who claimed responsibility?
A

Yes.

7 I

Q

And he stated he was a guide?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Did you talk with the other two people on the

10
11
12
13
14

He did.

mountain?
A

It seems like I did briefly, but I don't remember

what the conversation was.
Q

Okay.

Did he indicate that the person, I guess the

person who said he was a guide, was that Mr. Parker?

15

A

I believe that's the name, yes.

16

Q

Was--did he indicate that he'd been in the area

17

before that time?

18

A

Yes.

He did.

19

Q

Do you remember what he indicated about that?

20

A

He indicated that he had tried to climb the mountain

21

from a different area, I believe which was more to the west,

22

and in doing so, they couldn't get to where they wanted to get

23

and so they had gone around this other way.

24
25

Q

Okay.

onto the road?

Did you witness them causing rocks to come

A

Yes.

I did.

Q

Did you--how did you get them down from the

mountain?
4 I

A

Well, it seems like it--it took a little working and

5 | I, you know, I asked him to be very careful and not--try not
6 I to kick any rocks, but they was in such a position that that
7 | was almost impossible.

And he said, give me a minute, I

8 | believe, and then they just worked their way back down and
then down to the road.
10 I

Q

Okay.

And were there rocks on the road?

11 |

A

Yes, there was.

12 I

Q

What--do you remember the size of those rocks?

13

A

Not for sure.

I remember they was kind of like

14

medium size, they wasn't large.

15

don't know, maybe 12 inches at the most.

16

really don't remember the size.

17
18

Q

Okay.

They would be probably, oh, I
It's hard to say, I

Did you have a chance to speak with the

driver of the vehicle?

19

A

Yes.

I did.

20

Q

Do you remember what was said, if anything?

21

A

Oh, it seems like--seems like his statement was is

22

that he was just--he had been coming around and he seen

23

several of the rocks on the road and in trying to avoid them,

24

he had run over one.

25

Q

Okay.

And you indicated earlier that that had

1 I caused damaged to his vehicle?
2 I

A

3

QQ

4 J

A

Yes, it had.
Were you aware of the extent of the damage?
Well, we knew that it was transmission fluid, I

believe there was transmission fluid on the road.

And the--

6 I well, it seems like the vehicle was inoperable, but I can't be
7

positive about that.

8 J

10 I
11

Q

Are you aware as to whether a tow truck was called?

A

I don't remember.

Q

Did you--now, you--you stated that Mr. Parker

admitted that it was his fault?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And did he ask you not to charge the other two

14
15

He did.

people he was guiding?
A

Yes.

He did.

16

MR. PARKER:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

21

THE WITNESS:

22

there.

23

Q

25

Excuse me?

I'm sorry.

He told me he was the responsible one

and that he was the guide and he was--

20

24

Objection, leading.

Overruled.

(By Mr. McKay)

--guiding them across the--the face

Okay.

And were citations issued to

anyone?
A

I believe I did issue a citation to Mr. Parker.

11
1
2

Q

How frequently do you drive up and down Big

Cottonwood Canyon?

3

A

4

four times.

Oh, probably--it depends; summertime, maybe three or
Maybe--it--it varies, sometimes I'll be in that

canyon quite a bit, sometimes, you'll only make one trip
through that canyon.
7
8
9

Q

When you say that three or four times, that would be

per day, is that what you're talking about?
A

Right.

On--yes.

On--it's hard to say because some

10

days you will go up and down three or four times, other days,

11

you'll only make it once because of the other canyons.

12

Q

Where, exactly, did this accident happen?

13

A

It happened on the Storm Mountain slide area, just-

14
15
16

above the dairy bridge.
Q

Is that that area where there's a large rock hill to

the south side of the road?

17

A

Yes, sir.

18

Q

And that's a--that area is posted as a slide area,

19

isn't it?

20

A

Yes, sir.

21

Q

That's the Storm Mountain slide area sign?

22

A

Yes, sir.

23 '

Q

And there's also a falling rock sign right before

24
25

that area , isn't there?
A

There is.

21
1
2

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR._McKAYi

3

Q

State your name and address for the Court, please.

4

A

John Schirack, S-c-h-i-r-a-c-k.

5

North Valley View Drive, Layton

6

address from when--when this accident happened.

7
8

Q

Okay.

A

I was.

10

Q

Okay.

12

That is a different

On June 19th, were you in the vicinity of

Storm Mountain?

9

11

84040.

Address is 1842

Can you tell us what you were doing there,

who you were with, where you were going?
A

Well, there were six of us, my wife, our daughter,

13

her husband and their two kids.

14

at the restaurant, Silver Fork —

We were going up to breakfast

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

--Silver Fork Restaurant up Big Cottonwood Canyon.

17

QQ

And as you were traveling up the canyon, you can

18

around the--well, tell me what happened immediately prior to

19

the accident?

20

A

Well, we were driving up--I was driving up the--

21

there, there's a curve, had to come around the curve and there

22

was a lot of brush right there, you couldn't see for a little

23

bit, but after I was able to see, there was one big boul--big

24

rock out in the center of the street and there were--I started

25

to turn to the right to miss that, and then I noticed out of
/ /*» /N -1 \

~»<^0

~» Vl ,1 "1

22
1 1 the corner of my eye, numerous rocks coming down.

I don't

2 ] know which one I hit, but it was one of these that was rolling
3 I down, and I had to pull forward a little further because the
4 I rock--there was such a slide of rocks coming down, I wanted-5

didn't want to stop the car out in the path of the rocks.

So,

6

I went approximately a hundred yards beyond where the damage

7

was done.

8

Q

Okay.

Then what happened?

9

A

Well, I got out of the car and I immediately noticed

10

a big trail of some kind of--of fluid, from where the accident

11

happened up to where I stopped, so I knew there was damage.

12

And about, I--I would say about three minutes later, Officer

13

Bench came, and he--he stated that he'd been told by somebody

14

down below, at the foot of the canyon, that someone was

15

kicking rocks up there onto the road, so that he was on his

16

way up there at the time this accident happened, that's why he

17

arrived so quick after it happened.

18

contacting him, he just happened to show up.

We had no way of

19

Q

Okay.

Did you observe what his actions were?

20

A

Whose actions?

21

Q

Officer Bench, yes.

22

A

Well, he just--at first, I kinda signaled to him and

Bench?

23

then he--he started to come up toward me, that hundred yards

24

or so and then these rocks kept coming and he--he yelled up at

25

the fellows up on the mountain, you know, to stop whatever

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL JUDGE' FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Court to consider that.
If the Court believes that there--that Mr. Parker
specifically was more than 50 percent at fault himself, and I
don't think that the evidence establi-shed that at all.

I

5 I think that the most you could say is that somebody up there
6 | did it, but we don't know who, the--the plaintiff's evidence
7 | is that good, the defendant's evidence is clearly that Mr.
Parker did not knock the rock down, although it's possible
9 | that someone else in the group may have.
10 I

THE COURT:

11 I

Response?

12

MR. McKAY:

13

(Mr. McKay's rebuttal argument not requested to be

14

Thank you.

Just quickly, your Honor.

transcribed.)

15

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

16

After hearing the evidence in the case, I rule in

17

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum

18

of $2,746.47.

19

I'm convinced by a preponderance of the evidence

20

that the defendant was, you might say the guide, that he was

21

responsible for the rock slide, he certainly was the leader,

22

the one that led 'out, began to move across the rock slide

23

area.

24
25

The fact that--that there was some publication here
that the defendant relied upon to climb in the rock slide area

6
1 I really is not very persuasive to the Court at all.

Certainly

2 | doesn't obviate any liability in the estimation of the Court.
Mr. Parker had driven in this area many times, he
knew that it was a--a rock slide area, he referred to it as
5 | probably the worst rock slide area in that particular canyon.
6 I He was very familiar with the road and very familiar with the
7

fact that rocks could fall from the--from that particular

8

mountain area on to the road.

9

In fact, you know, I'm persuaded by the fact that he

10

talked to the officer, made a statement to the officer that he

11

was responsible for what had taken place.

12

was used, whether or not--I'm not exactly certain beyond a

13

reasonable doubt that he used the word "guide", but at least

14

by a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the word

15

"guide" was his word that was utilized or stated at this

16

particular time.

17

The word "guide"

The amount of damage appears in the estimation of

18

the Court to be reasonable.

The defense, it's true, has

19

stated--presented some evidence to the Court that perhaps a

20

lower sum would be more reasonable, but I'm not persuaded by a

21

preponderance of the evidence that it would be more

22

reasonable.

23

out, as I view credibility of the witnesses and the

24

credibility of the evidence, it appears that this estimate

It's a preponderance standard as I weigh that

25 I made by Farmers is a reasonable estimate.

The--the owner of

7
1 I the vehicle, himself, can estimate damage; in a round-about
2

way, that was done, not very direct, but somewhat round-about,

3

and the figure seems, in the estimation of the Court to be

4

reasonable.

5

Regarding the--the reasonableness of Mr. Schirack's

6 I driving, it appears to the Court that he exercised due caution
and care, that he was reasonable; could he have done a better
job in avoiding the collision?

Perhaps.

Perhaps a more

experienced driver or a professional driver would have driven
10 | it a little bit differently, but it appears to the estimation
11

of the Court that Mr. Schirack acted reasonably in the way

12

that he drove in this particular situation.

13

There were clearly a number of rocks on the road

14

down in that area, 15 or 20 rocks.

15

at the same time, and in the estimation of the Court, when the

16

defendant began to lead this expedition, I mean, there are

17

certain risks associated with it, there are certain duties

18

associated with it, the duty is to climb across the--the

19

mountain without causing any rock slide or causing rocks to

20

fall on to the mountain.

21

that there were rock slides in the area; nevertheless, he

22

undertook to pursue the matter.

23

Certainly, he knew about the fact

That's the rationale of the Court, those are the

24
oc

The rocks didn't all fall

findings of the Court.
'

Are there any additional findings that the defense

a
1 I or the prosecution of this case would like me to make, or any
2 | further clarifications on conclusions of law?
MR. McKAY:
4 I
5

None that I'm aware of.

MR. PARKER:

I'd like you to make a finding that

there was no pecuniary interest involved in the--

6

THE COURT:

I'll do that.

There's no pecuniary

7 J interest between Mr. Parker and the other people that were
involved in the climb itself.

That appears to be clear.

The way I'm apportioning negligence is zero percent
10 | to the driver of the vehicle, 100 percent to Mr. Parker in
11 | this particular case.
12 |

And it's also my conclusion that under our joint

13 I several liability law here in this State, that Mr. Parker
14

would be responsible.

15

MR. McKAY:

Your Honor, if I may just say something

16

about that?

17

State.

18

to prove fault as to each person, we don't have joint several

19

liability.

20

We don't have joint and several liability in this

We have the--that--that act that requires people to--

THE COURT:

Well, what I mean by that is, Mr. Parker

21

did not bring anyone else in on this case; I mean, he didn't

22

file any third-party complaints against anyone else.

23

basically stands here alone.

™

I

MR. McKAY:

He

Well, it's--I don't think it's necessary

9
in the case.

I mean, you--you can attribute fault to non-

2 j parties, that's very clear, and-3 |

THE COURT:

Well, and I'm attributing fault, all I'm

4 I saying is heMR. McKAY:

And I'm just trying to keep my record

THE COURT:

--had a remedy--you can keep--sure.

6 I clear.
7
8

I'm saying is, he had a remedy here that he did not avail

9

himself of.

All

He could have, I'm not saying he should have but

10

for whatever reason, he did not avail himself of that remedy.

11

But, as I apportion out fault here, I find a hundred percent

12

for Mr. Parker.

13
14

Is there any other statement that needs to be
clarified by the Court for either side?

15

I'll direct that the plaintiff prepare findings of

16

fact and conclusions of law in conformity with the decision of

17

the Court.

18

bringing the action.

19

MR. McKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

Just file an affidavit of costs.

21

MR. McKAY:

I will.

22

THE COURT:

Or a memorandum of costs--

23

MR. McKAY:

Thank you.

24

THE COURT:

--with the judgment form.

25 I

Thank you very much.

Plaintiff is also granted costs associated with

